ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of an energy harvesting relay system, where a legitimate source communicates with a legitimate destination via the assistance of multiple trusted relays. In the considered system, the source and relays deploy the time-switching-based radio frequency energy harvesting technique to harvest energy from a multi-antenna beacon. Different antenna selection and relay selection schemes are applied to enhance the security of the system. Specifically, two relay selection schemes based on the partial and full knowledge of channel state information, i.e., optimal relay selection and partial relay selection, and two antenna selection schemes for harvesting energy at source and relays, i.e., maximizing energy harvesting channel for the source and maximizing energy harvesting channel for the selected relay, are proposed. The exact and asymptotic expressions of secrecy outage probability in these schemes are derived. We demonstrate that applying relay selection approaches in the considered energy harvesting system can enhance the security performance. In particular, optimal relay selection scheme outperforms partial relay selection scheme and achieves full secrecy diversity order, regardless of energy harvesting scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a strong, credible body of evidence suggesting that climate changes are largely caused by human activities, e.g., the increase in CO2 levels associated with global energy consumption. With the rapid increase of mobileconnected devices and base stations, the mobile and wireless industry annually causes a significant carbon emission, i.e., totally 2% of the worldwide, and the fastest growing sector. As a result, the green aspect of the fifth generation (5G) networks is utmost concern. Energy harvesting (EH) communication have recently gained a great attention as a promising technology for 5G wireless networks [1] - [3] . The radio frequency (RF) EH communications are expected to fundamentally reshape the landscape of the ICT industry in the near future via its incorporation into the Internet-ofthings (IoT) and Machine-to-machine (M2M) communications. Important applications include wireless powered sensor networks (WPSNs) and wireless powered body networks.
Relay networks have been well-known for enhancing the coverage of wireless systems [4] . The main principle is that one or some aiding nodes are deployed to deliver messages from the information source node to its destinations when the direct transmission is unavailable. To enhance the performance of relay networks, various relay selection protocols and relaying schemes, such as amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF), were introduced [5] , [6] .
However, in some practical scenarios, i.e. wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the source and relay nodes are energyconstrained, which limits the network performance. Prolonging the life time of these networks has many difficulties since replacing or recharging batteries is either inconvenient or undesirable [7] . To overcome such a challenge, RF EH has been proposed in relay networks and has attracted a great deal of attention recently [8] - [10] . To enable EH, a wireless node is equipped with rectifying circuits that can transform RF signal from information source nodes/power beacons into DC current. This DC current is then used for signal processing and transmission of the wireless node. However, it is such a challenge to apply RF EH in practice because of high path-loss and low energy-efficient circuitry. Fortunately, the recent developments in wireless communication and electronics technologies have tackled these problems. On the one hand, large-scale antenna arrays [11] , millimetre-wave communications [12] , and small cells [13] technologies, which reduce the transmission distance and enhance transmission efficiency, adequately alleviate the propagational loss. On the other hand, low-power electronics technology continuously enhances the energy efficiency of the circuitry [14] . As a consequence, RF EH holds tremendous potential to enable in the 5G wireless communication systems. The authors in [15] proposed different theoretical dynamic power splitting schemes, i.e., time switching (TS), static power splitting (SPS), and on-off power splitting (OPS), and two practical EH architectures for receiver. In [16] , the authors proposed two EH protocols, i.e., time switching-based relaying (TSR) protocol and power splitting-based relaying (PSR) protocol, for AF relay networks. In [17] , an EH scheme in cognitive radio network where the secondary users can harvest RF energy from nearby active primary users, was investigated. A wireless powered communication network in which the users can harvest RF energy from the hybrid access point via downlinks and use this energy to transfer information to the access point through uplinks, was studied in [18] . Inspired by these works, in [19] , the authors investigated the application of TSR EH in a AF/DF cooperative communication system with taking into consideration the continuous and discrete time scenarios. In [20] , the trade-off between two relay selection protocols, i.e., selecting the best relay for information transmission and selecting the best relay for EH, was investigated. In [21] , the authors examined a beamforming scheme in a TSR EH system with multi-antenna full-duplex DF relays. The authors considered an EH system in which a multi-antenna power beacon creates power beamforming to supply the source and the relay in [22] . These studies have laid a solid foundation for understanding the role of EH in relay networks.
Although EH relay networks have significant advantages, transmitting energy and information simultaneously makes the data transmissions vulnerable to security attacks. The upper layer cryptographic techniques are typically deployed to secure the confidential messages against wiretapping in conventional wireless communications. However, these high layer security schemes are more expensive and uncertain.
To support the existing cryptographic protocols, physical layer security (PLS), which exploits the characteristics of wireless channels to improve the security of wireless transmission [23] , [24] , has been proposed as a promising solution [25] - [31] . Recently, there have been studies on PLS for EH networks. In [32] , the authors considered the simultaneously wireless information and power transferring network with eavesdroppers and two types of receivers: desired receivers and idle receivers, in which the latter are treated as potential eavesdroppers. In [33] , the authors proposed a cooperative jamming scheme, where a multi-antenna jammer harvests energy from the source and uses this energy to transmit jamming signals. Nevertheless, the secrecy performance of EH relay networks has not been well investigated.
In this paper, we investigate the security performance of an EH relay network, in which the source and relays are powered by RF energy from a multi-antenna power beacon.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose two relay selection protocols, namely optimal relay selection (ORS) and partial relay selection (PRS), to secure EH relay networks. In addition, two antenna selection scenarios are also considered at the power beacon, i.e., maximizing EH at the source (MEHS) and maximizing EH at the selected relay (MEHR).
• The exact-closed form and asymptotic expressions of secrecy outage probability (SOP) are developed to investigate the secrecy performance of two relay selection strategies with two EH scenarios.
• We have demonstrated that ORS scheme outperforms PRS scheme and achieves full secrecy diversity order, regardless of EH scenarios. Besides, increasing the number of relays and deploying multi-antenna power beacon significantly improves the security performance of the considered system. Although the performance of MEHS and MEHR scenarios is similar in ORS scheme, MEHR scenario shows a greater enhancement on SOP in PRS scheme than MEHS scenario does. In addition, the EH duration in a transmission block time has a significant impact on SOP of the considered system and should be carefully considered.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
We consider a network consisting of a power beacon B, an information source S, K DF relays R k , k = {1, . . . , K }, a destination D and an eavesdropper E as shown in Fig. 1 . The power beacon B is equipped with N antennas while S, R k , E, and D are equipped with single antenna. We assume that all the channels are subject to Rayleigh fading. Therefore, the channel power gains are exponential distributed with parameter λ XY , where X ∈ {B, S, R} and Y ∈ {S, R, E, D}. The additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at R k and D has zero mean and variance N 0 .
A. ENERGY HARVESTING SCHEME
In the considered system, S and R k harvest energy from B, and then use this energy to transmit signals. In order to reduce the complexity of signal processing, the power beacon in the considered system applies antenna selection technique to facilitate S and R k * in harvesting energy, where the subscript k * indicates the aiding relay that is selected in the relay selection process. In addition, we assume that B can only be temporarily deployed to deliver wireless energy to S and R k * because of its transmission duty with other nodes. At S and R k * , the TS based EH technique is applied thanks to its high throughput [16] and its protocol is described in Fig. 2 . In a transmission block time T (in which a block of information is sent from S to D), S and R k * use a duration of αT to harvest energy from B, where α is the EH time fraction that depends on the schedule of B. The time slot of (1 − α)T is then divided into two equal time slots for S → R k * and R k * → D transmissions. Therefore, the energy harvested at S and R k * respectively are [16] 
where 0 < η < 1 is the efficiency coefficient of the energy conversion process, 0 < α < 1, P B is the transmit power of B, |h B n * S | 2 and |h B n * R k * | 2 are channel power gains of the links from the chosen antenna n * at B to S and R k * , respectively. Optimizing α is out of the scope of this paper. Under the assumption that the processing energy at S and R k * is negligible, the transmit power of S and R k * are respectively given by [16] 
In the considered system, B can select one transmit antenna from its N antennas to maximize the energy harvested at either S or R k * .
1) MAXIMIZING ENERGY HARVESTING AT THE SOURCE (MEHS)
The chosen antenna can be selected to strengthen the B → S link as follows:
2) MAXIMIZING ENERGY HARVESTING AT THE SELECTED RELAY (MEHR)
For maximizing the B → R k * link, the chosen antenna can be selected as
B. SECURITY SCENARIOS
In the considered system, E is able to wiretap to the signal transmitted from S and R k * . We assume that there is no direct link from B → E. Therefore, E is not disturbed by the EH phase of S and R k * . Attempting to enhance security performance, S and R k use different code books. Therefore, the secrecy capacity of the considered system is written as [34] , [35]
where C 1s and C 2s are the achievable secrecy rate of the first hop and the second hop, respectively, expressed as follows:
where the fraction 1−α 2 accounts for the fact that during a total block time T , the duration transmission of each hop is
is the SNR at D, γ 1E and γ 2E are the SNRs of the first and the second hop at E, respectively, = 1−α 2 . The SNR γ 1M is given by
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(1−α) , and |h SR k * | 2 is the channel power gain of S → R k * link. Similarly, γ 2M , γ 1E , and γ 2E are respectively shown as
where |h R k * D | 2 , |h SE | 2 , and |h R k * E | 2 are the channel power gains of R k * → D, S → E, and R k * → E links, respectively,
, and N E is the variance of the AWGN at E.
1) PARTIAL RELAY SELECTION (PRS)
In some networks such as WSNs, owing to the energy and channel estimation overhead constraints, relay selection based on the full knowledge of channel state information (CSI) of all links is not feasible. Thus, PRS scheme, which chooses the helping relay based on only the CSI of the S → R k links, can be used. With PRS, the helping relay R k * is selected as
Therefore, the SNR at R k * given by (10) can be rewritten as
where n * ∈ {s, r}, see (5) and (6) . From (15), (5), and (6), the achievable secrecy rates of PRS scheme with two different antenna selection strategies at B are written as
2) OPTIMAL RELAY SELECTION (ORS)
In ORS scheme, we assume that S has full knowledge of all links' CSI 1 in the network to choose the aiding relay for maximizing the secrecy capacity of the system. The aiding relay R k * is chosen as
1 When eavesdropper is in active mode, the CSI of eavesdropping channels can be obtained. However, if eavesdropper deploys passive eavesdropping scheme, attaining CSI of wiretapping channels will be difficult.
From (18) and (5), the achievable secrecy rates of ORS scheme with MEHS is written as
From (18) and (6), the secrecy capacity of ORS scheme with MEHR is given as
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this paper, SOP is used to evaluate the security performance of the considered system. Therefore, in this section, the analytic expressions of the considered system's SOP are provided.
A. PARTIAL RELAY SELECTION 1) MAXIMIZING ENERGY HARVESTING AT THE SOURCE
From (16), we have
where From (21) we have the following lemma. Lemma 1: The SOP of the considered system in the PRS scheme with MEHS is formulated as follows:
where 
where
From (24), we have the following lemma. Lemma 2: The SOP of the considered system in the PRS scheme with MEHR is derived as
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
B. OPTIMAL RELAY SELECTION 1) MAXIMIZING ENERGY HARVESTING AT THE SOURCE
From (19), we have
From (27) we have the following lemma. Lemma 3: The SOP of the considered system in the ORS scheme with MEHS is calculated as follows:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
2) MAXIMIZING ENERGY HARVESTING AT THE SELECTED RELAY
From (20), we have
From (30), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4: The SOP of the considered system in the ORS scheme with MEHR is formulated as
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In this section, the asymptotic expressions of SOP are provided to have important insights into the security performance, i.e., secrecy coding and diversity gains, when quality of the legitimate channels and SNR of the considered system are high.
A. PARTIAL RELAY SELECTION
The asymptotic expression of SOP in PRS scheme with MEHS/MEHR strategies are demonstrated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5: When quality of the legitimate channels and SNR of the considered system are high, the asymptotic expression of SOP in PRS schemes with MEHS/MEHR strategies is formulated as
where the secrecy diversity order is
and the secrecy coding gain is
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
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From Lemma 5, we can observe that the system with PRS scheme obtains a secrecy diversity order of one, regardless of EH scenarios.
B. OPTIMAL RELAY SELECTION
The asymptotic expression of SOP in ORS scheme with MEHS/MEHR strategies are demonstrated in the following lemma. Lemma 6: When quality of the legitimate channels and SNR of the considered system are high, the asymptotic expression of SOP in ORS schemes with MEHS/MEHR strategies is as follows:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix F. From Lemma 6, we can observe that the system with ORS scheme obtains full secrecy diversity order, regardless of EH scenarios.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the simulation results based on Monte Carlo method are provided to verify the accuracy of the above performance analysis. = 0.1. As increasing K , the SOP of the considered system decreases. Specifically, compared with the PRS strategy, the ORS strategy is more affected by the number of relays. In addition, in PRS scheme with MEHS, the effect of the number of relays is small at high γ M . Besides, by comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 4 , we can see that SOP of PRS scheme with MEHR scenario is lower than that of PRS scheme with MEHS scenario. The reason is that in PRS scheme with MEHR scenario, the first hop secrecy performance is strengthened by using PRS strategies and the secrecy performance of the second hop is improved by using MEHR method, which result in an overall improvement in the SOP of the system. Meanwhile, in PRS scheme with MEHS scenario, only the transmission of the first hop is enhanced. As a consequence, the security performance of the second hop dominates the overall performance when γ M increases.
In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , the effect of the number of antennas at the power beacon on the security performance of MEHS and MEHR schemes in the case of low-quality legitimate channels is respectively demonstrated. The configuration is that the legitimate links have the channel mean power of 
In general, as the number of power beacon antennas increases, the SOP of the considered system decreases. Interestingly, the secure performance improves substantially when the number of power beacon antennas increases from one to two. But the improvement is minor if the number of power beacon antennas is greater than two. The results also demonstrate that ORS scheme benefits from increasing N more than PRS scheme does with either MEHS or MEHR strategies. Besides, N has a higher influence on PRS scheme with MEHR strategy than PRS scheme with MEHS strategy. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 describe the influence of the number of relays on the secrecy performance of the considered system 3354 VOLUME 4, 2016 FIGURE 5. MEHS schemes' SOP with different numbers of antennas at the power beacon when quality of the legitimate channels is low. when the quality of the legitimate channels and SNR of the considered system are high. In this simulation, the legitimate links have the channel mean power of 
From the result, we witness that as the number of relays increases, the secrecy performance of ORS schemes is significantly enhanced because of its full secrecy diversity order. Meanwhile, in PRS schemes, increasing K improves the secrecy performance in low γ M region thanks to its unit secrecy diversity order. Finally, to investigate how the energy harvesting time in a transmission block time affects the security performance, we consider the SOP as a function of α, see Fig. 9 . The system is configured that γ M = 20 dB, γ E = 10 dB, R th = 0.2 bits/s/Hz, η = 0.6,
In all schemes, we can see that if α is either too small or too high, the SOP is large. The explanation is that on the one hand, if α is small, S and R k * can not harvest sufficient energy for a secure transmission. On the other hand, if energy harvesting time is too long, the transmission duration will be short and hence the secrecy capacity is low. Therefore, α should be carefully designed for efficient security. In our examples, α = 0.5 is nearly optimal.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the secrecy performance of an EH system with multiple DF relays and a multi-antenna beacon has been investigated. In particular, two relay selection strategies, namely ORS and PRS, were proposed to secure the system. In addition, two energy harvesting scenarios, i.e., maximizing energy harvesting for the source and maximizing energy harvesting for the selected relay, were also investigated. The analytic and asymptotic expressions of SOP in these schemes were derived. The results have shown that the deployment of ORS together with multiple relays and multiple antennas at the power beacon can significantly enhance the security of the considered EH system. In particular, ORS achieves full secrecy diversity order while PRS has unit secrecy diversity order, regardless of the EH strategies. Besides, MEHR strategy shows a greater support in PRS scheme than MEHS strategy does. Furthermore, duration of EH process has a significant impact on the secrecy performance of the considered system and should be mindfully determined.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From (21), we have
The CDF of γ MEHS 1PRS is expressed as The CDF of γ MEHS 2PRS is given as 
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From (17), we have
2)
The CDF of γ MEHS 1PRS is expressed as
where (B.3) can be achieved with the help of [36, eq. (3.324.1)]. The CDF of γ MEHR 2PRS is given as 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From (27), we have
We denote that Y o = |h B s S | 2 , and Z o = |h SE | 2 . The CDF of γ MEHS ORS can be derived as follows:
After performing some mathematical manipulations, we achieve (29) with the help of [36, eq. (3.324.1)].
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We denote that Z o = |h SE | 2 . The CDF of γ MEHR ORS can be derived as follows:
After performing some mathematical manipulations, we obtain (32) with the help of [36, eq. (3.324.1)].
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 5
From (A.3), in the high channel quality and high SNR regime, the CDF of γ MEHS 1PRS can be calculated as Following the similar steps in (E.1), the CDF of γ MEHS 2PRS in the high channel quality and high SNR regime is formulated as
From (E.1) and (E.2), using (33) is accomplished. Similarly, in PRS scheme with MEHR strategy, we get the same asymptotic expression of SOP.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF LEMMA 6
From (20), in the high channel quality and high SNR regime, γ MEHR 1ORS and γ MEHR 2ORS can be formulated respectively as
The CDF of γ MEHR 1ORS conditioned on Z o = |h SE | 2 can be calculated as
where step (a) is obtained by using the McLaurin expansion of exp(x) and neglecting the high order items for small x. Similarly, with the help of [36, eq. (3.351.
3)], the CDF of γ MEHR 2ORS is given as follows:
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